In this paper we show how abstract interpretation, and more specifically completeness, provides an adequate model for reasoning about code obfuscation and watermarking. The idea is that making a program obscure, or equivalently hiding information in it, corresponds to force an interpreter (the attacker) to become incomplete in its attempts to extract information about the program. Here abstract interpretation provides the model of the attacker (malicious host) and abstract interpretation transformers provide driving methods for understanding and designing new obfuscation and watermarking strategies: Obfuscation corresponds to make the malicious host incomplete and watermarking corresponds to hide secrets where incomplete attackers cannot extract them unless some secret key is given.
Introduction
Protection via obscurity is gaining more and more attention as a practical method for DRM and IPP in software design. Malicious host attacks exploit sensitive information leakage e.g., by source code analysis, knowledge extraction by static and dynamic analysis, program decomposition for code reuse, source code disassembly and decompilation for reverse engineering, and integrity corruption for code haking [36] . Negative results on the impossibility of perfect and universal obscurity, such as [4] , did not dishearten researchers in developing methods and algorithms for hiding sensitive information in programs. As well as Rice's theorem represented the greatest challenge for the development of automatic program analysis and verification tools, the impossibility of obfuscation against malicious host attacks is a major challenge for developing concrete techniques which are sufficiently robust that an attacker is in trouble for a sufficient amount of time in trying to defeat them. Code obfuscation, software watermarking and steganography are successful examples of these tools, gaining an increasing importance in the quality of critical software products [11] .
Hiding information means both hiding as making it imperceptible and obscuring as making it incomprehensible [44] . In programming, perception and comprehension of code's structure and behaviour are deep semantic concepts, which depend on the relative degree of abstraction of the observer, which corresponds precisely to program semantics. In this paper we show that abstract interpretation can be used as an adequate model for developing a unifying theory of information hiding in software, by modeling observers (i.e., malicious host attackers) O as suitable abstract interpreters. An observation can be any static or dynamic interpretation of programs intended to extract properties from its semantics and abstract interpretation [14] provides the best framework to understand semantics at different levels of abstraction. The long standing experience in digital media protection by obscurity is inspiring here. It is known that practical steganography is an issue where compression methods are inefficient: "Where efficient compression is available, information hiding becomes vacuous." [3] . This means that the gain provided by compression can be used for hiding information. This, in contrast to cryptography, strongly relies upon the understanding of the supporting media: if we have a source which is completely understandable, i.e., it can be perfectly compressed, then steganography becomes trivial. In programming languages, a complete understanding of semantics means that no loss of precision is introduced by approximating data and control components while analysing computations. Complete abstractions [15, 34] model precisely the complete understanding of program semantics by an approximate observer, which corresponds to the possibility of replacing, with no loss of precision, concrete computations with abstract ones -some sort of perfect semantic compressibility around a given property. This includes, for instance, both static and dynamic, via monitoring, approaches to information disclosure and reverse engineering [18] . The lack of completeness of the observer is therefore the corresponding of its poor understanding of program semantics, and provides the key aspect for understanding and designing a new family of methods and tools for software steganography and obfuscation. Consider the simple statement, C : x = a * b, multiplying a and b, and storing the result in x. An automated program sign analysis replacing concrete computations with approximated ones (i.e., the rule of signs) is able to catch, with no loss of precision, the intended sign behaviour of C because the sign abstraction O = {+, 0, −}, is complete for integer multiplication. If we replace C with O(C): x = 0; if b ≤ 0 then {a = −a; b = −b}; while b = 0 {x = a + x; b = b − 1} we obfuscate the observer O because the rule of signs is incomplete for integer addition. Intervals, i.e., a far more concrete observer, are required in order to automatically understand the sign computed in O(C). We show how this idea can be extended to arbitrary obfuscation methods and exploited for code steganography, providing the basis for a unifying theory for these technologies in terms of abstract interpretation. By some examples and ideas, we show how obfuscation can be viewed as a program transformation making abstractions incomplete and at the same time we show how watermark extraction can be viewed as a complete abstract interpretation against a secrete program property, extending abstract watermarking [19] to any watermarking method. Both obfuscation and watermarking can be specified as transformers to achieve completeness/incompleteness in abstract interpretation [29] , provided that the transformed code does not interfere with the expected input/output behaviour of programs. This latter correctness criteria can be again specified as a completeness problem by considering abstract noninterference [27] as the method for controlling information leakage in obfuscation and steganography. Our approach is language independent and can be applied to most known obfuscation and watermarking methods, providing a common ground for their understanding and comparison.
Basic mathematical notation
If S and T are sets, then ℘(S) denotes the powerset of S and S × T denotes the Cartesian product of S and T , If
We will often denote f ({x}) as f (x) and use lambda notation for functions. f •g def = λx. f (g(x)). C, ≤ denotes a poset C with ordering relation ≤, while C, ≤, ∨, ∧, , ⊥ denotes a complete lattice C, with ordering ≤, lub ∨, glb ∧, top and bottom element and ⊥ respectively. id def = λx. x and T def = λx. . The point-wise ordered set of monotone functions, denoted
−→ holds when f preserved lubs's of chains. Co-additivity and cocontinuity are dually defined. Weaker notions of additivity have been studied in the context of abstract domain transformers. f :
. Meet-uniformity is defined dually.
Abstract domains
Abstract interpretation is a general theory for deriving sound approximations of the semantics of discrete dynamic systems, e.g., programming languages [14] . We consider Galois connection-based abstract interpretation [15] . α : C m −→ A and γ : A m −→ C form an adjunction or a Galois connection (GC), denoted C, α, γ, A , if ∀x ∈ C, ∀y ∈ A: α(x) ≤ A y ⇔ x ≤ C γ(y). α (resp. γ) is the left-(right-) adjoint to γ (α) and it is an additive (co-additive) function. Additive and co-additive functions f admit respectively right and left adjoint: f [5] ). If ∀a ∈ A: α(γ(a)) = a, then C, α, γ, A is a Galois insertion (GI). In GC-based abstract interpretation the concrete and abstract domains, C and A, are complete lattices [14] . An upper (lower) closure ρ : C m −→ C in uco(C) (lco(C)) is any idempotent and extensive: ∀x ∈ C. x ≤ ρ(x) (reductive: ∀x ∈ C. x ≥ ρ(x)) operator. Closure operators are uniquely determined by the set of their fix-points ρ(C). X ⊆ C is the set of fixpoints of ρ ∈ uco(C) iff X is a Moore-family of C, i.e.,
being an isomorphism, and C, ι•ρ, ι −1 , A is the GI, i.e., ρ = γ•α. Dual properties can be derived for lower closures. uco(C) is therefore isomorphic to the so called lattice of abstract interpretations of C [15] . If C is a complete lattice then uco(C) and lco(C) ordered point-wise are also complete lattices. For upper closures uco(C), , , , T, id where for every ρ, η ∈ uco(C), {ρ i } i∈I ⊆ uco(C) and x ∈ C: ρ η iff η(C) ⊆ ρ(C); ( i∈I ρ i )(x) = ∧ i∈I ρ i (x); and ( i∈I ρ i )(x) = x ⇔ ∀i ∈ I. ρ i (x) = x. Dual properties can be derived for lco(C), , , , id, λx. ⊥ . In the following we will find particularly convenient to identify closure operators (and therefore abstract domains) with their sets of fix-points. Let ρ ∈ uco(C), its disjunctive completion is (ρ) = {η ∈ uco(C)|η ρ and η is additive}. ρ is disjunctive iff ρ(C) is a complete sublattice of C iff (ρ) = ρ (cf. [15] ). If π is a partition (viz. an equivalence relation), then [·] π is the corresponding equivalence class. A closure η ∈ uco(℘(C)) induces a partition on
The most concrete closure that induces the same partition of values as η is Π(η) [47] . Reduced product and power are the best known operations to compose abstract domains in order to exploit respectively the attribute independent and relational properties of programs [15] . The reduced product of a family of domains {ρ i } i∈I ⊆ uco(C) is i∈I ρ i . The reduced relative power in [33] is a generalization over arbitrary quantales of Cousot's original reduced power [15] . Let C, ≤, 1 be a semi-quantale [50] , i.e. an algebraic structure where C, ≤ is a complete lattice and 1: C × C −→ C is an associative, commutative, and additive binary operation. Given a pair of Galois connections between a concrete domain C and two domains A 1 and A 2 : C, α 1 , γ 1 , A 1 and C, α 2 , γ 2 , A 2 , we define the (relative) reduced power of A 1 and A 2 , as the set
The programming language
We consider a simple C-like non-deterministic imperative language, where programs in P are commands over standard expressions e, evaluated in the set of values V:
if e {c} {c} | while e {c} Var(P ) will denote the set of variables of P . The operational semantics is standard [53] and naturally induces a transition relation on the set of states Σ, denoted , specifying the relation between a state and its possible successors in a transition system Σ, . For the sake of simplicity we consider only finite (terminating) computations in Σ * .
The empty sequence is denoted ε. The length of σ ∈ Σ * is denoted |σ| ∈ N and its i-th element is denoted σ i . A non-empty finite trace σ ∈ Σ * is a finite sequence of consecutive states such that for all i < |σ|: σ i σ i+1 . The maximal finite trace semantics [16] of a transition system associated with a program P is denoted P , where P n = {σ ∈ Σ * ||σ| = n, ∀i ∈ [1, n) . σ i−1 σ i } and, if T ⊆ Σ is the set of final/blocking states, then P = n>0 {σ ∈ P n |σ n−1 ∈ T }. If σ ∈ P , then σ and σ = σ 0 denote, respectively, the final and initial state of σ. The semantics P has been obtained in [16] as a fix-point of the monotone operator
where is sequence concatenation. In this case:
The (angelic) denotational semantics associates (forward) input/output functions with programs, by ignoring nontermination. This semantics is derived in [13] by abstract interpretation from the maximal trace semantics with ab-
] can be associated with each P ∈ P, inductively on its syntax, such that
The weakest liberal precondition semantics is instead defined as wlp P 
Soundness
There are two equivalent ways to express the soundness of an abstraction [15] . Let f : C m −→ C, C, α, γ, A be a GI, and f : [15] . In the following, if
] is specified as fixpoint of (a combination of) predicatetransformers F P : C c −→ C, and ρ ∈ uco(C), we denote by
ρ the (fixpoint) semantics associated with
ρ is the best correct abstract interpretation of P in ρ. In this case ρ(
Completeness
While the above definitions of soundness are equivalent, they are not equivalent when equality is required, i.e., when we consider completeness [15, 34, 30] . Even if both imply
of precision is accumulated by approximating the input arguments of a given semantic function while f •γ = γ•f means that no loss of precision is accumulated by approximating the result of computations on abstract objects. We will follow [30] where the first is called backward (B) and the second is called forward (F) completeness. The key point in this construction is that there exists an either B or F-complete abstract function f in an abstract domain ρ ∈ uco(C) iff the best correct approximation ρ•f •ρ of f is respectively either B or F complete [34] , respectively
This means that both F and B completeness are properties of the underlying abstract domain and of the concrete function f . Therefore, by definition, completeness can be achieved either by transforming abstract domains or by transforming functions, which are in our case semantics.
Domain completeness
The problem of making abstract domains B-complete has been solved in [34] . These results have been extended to F-completeness in [30] . Let f :
A pair of domain transformers can be associated with any completeness problem. We follow [26, 31] by defining a domain refinement and simplification as any function τ : uco(C) m −→ uco(C) such that X ⊆ τ (X) and τ (X) ⊆ X respectively. In [34] and [30] , a constructive characterization of the most abstract refinement, called complete shell, and of the most concrete simplification, called complete core, of any domain, making it F or B complete, for a given continuous function f , is given as a solution of a simple domain equation. Consider the following basic operators on closures:
In [34] the authors proved that the only interesting cases, as far as the refinement and simplification towards -completeness are concerned, are respectively the most concrete β ρ such that β, η is -complete and the most abstract β η such that ρ, β is -complete.
The -complete shell of η is R ,ρ
therefore B(C, f ) = F(C, f + ) (cf. [30] ). Clearly, when we consider f : C c −→ C and the constraint η = ρ, the above construction requires a fixpoint iteration on abstract domains: R f (ρ) = gfp(λX. ρ R f (X)) and C f (ρ) = lfp(λX. ρ C f (X)) are called respectively the absolute -complete shell and core of ρ for f . Note that R f ∈ lco(uco(C)) and C f ∈ uco(uco(C)) (see [34] ). It is worth noting that -complete cores and shells are adjoint abstract domain transformers, i.e., for any ρ, η ∈ uco(C):
Semantic completeness
Being F-completeness usually simpler to handle (cf. [30] ), in the following of this section we consider F-completeness only. The problem of minimally transforming semantics in order to achieve (F-) completeness has been firstly addressed and solved in [29] . The authors proved that the set {f :
is an upper closure operator of C m −→ C, , and it is a lower closure iff ρ is additive. This means that there exist the closest complete approximations from above and from below of any given (possibly incomplete) semantics. For any f ∈ C m −→ C and η, ρ ∈ uco(C) define: One of the major achievements in [29] is the construction of a symmetric family of semantics transformers which induce maximal incompleteness. These are the adjoint operations associated with F ↓ and F ↑ , see Figure 1 :
All transformed semantics can be made monotone without afflicting minimality and completeness, see [29] for details. In this case, when they exist,
Obscuring code
Software obfuscation provides protection against reverse-engineering, the goal of which is to understand programs. Lexical, data and control-flow obfuscation are typical examples of obfuscation strategies devoted to confuse the understanding of respectively lexical, data and control-flow of a given program.
An obfuscating transformation, according to Collberg et al., is a program transformation O : P−→ P such that 1) O is a potent transformation, i.e., O(P ) is more obscure or complex that P and 2) P and O(P ) have the same observational behavior [8, 10, 11] . Potency is related with resiliency. O is a resilient transformation if P is hardly obtainable from O(P ) by automatic transformation (i.e., by deobfuscation). While observational equivalence can be precisely encoded in programming language semantics, the notion of potency and resilience of an obfuscation are relatively unexplored notions, where qualitative and quantitative methods have been introduced, without a general agreement on how potency and resilience can be formally expressed.
Collberg et al., [10] define potency as the relative complexity O(P ) with respect to P according to some known metrics such as code size, number of predicates, number of methods in OO programs, height of inheritance, and variable dependence length. Successful code obfuscation relying on these notions of potency include control-flow obfuscation by opaque predicate insertion, code flattening, variable splitting, bogus code insertion, and spurious aliases insertion. Wang et al. [52] relate potency with complexity of static program analysis, notably variable aliasing. The authors compile the problem of understanding controlflow into a general aliasing problem, which is NP-HARD. Cloacked programs extend this approach by specifying code transformations (basically flattening + obfuscated dispatchers) such that the understanding of the obfuscated controlflow corresponds to the solution of a known (hard) combinatorial problem. Here potency is related with the PSPACE complexity of reachability in dispatchers [7] . In data-type obfuscation, potency is related with data-refinement [25] . An obfuscated program can be seen as a program with refined data-types, provided that a GI is established between source data-types and obfuscated ones. If D is a data-type, D is a refinement of D if D, α, γ, D is a GI. Correctness of the obfuscation is here proved by proving
•γ, i.e., by proving that the source program is the bca of the obfuscated one with respect to the data-type refinement abstraction. Here obfuscation corresponds precisely to concretise (in the sense of abstract interpretation) a data-type. Potency is not directly addressed in this framework, even if it can be related with the distance between the concrete and abstract data-types, as shown in [23] . This framework has been successfully applied for complicating code understanding by program slicing [38] , where α and γ are programs which enlarge slices by adding dependencies and correctness is proved by requiring that P and γ; O(P ); α are observationally equivalent, i.e., preserved by O specifies its potency. Interestingly, in this framework, any program transformation can be interpreted as a program obfuscation with respect to some given property. Data and control-flow obfuscation by opaque predicate insertion have been specified in this framework. In particular, in [22] , the authors proved that complete abstractions are essential to break opaque predicates in control-flow deobfuscation. We follow [23] , and refine that notion of potency with respect to the notion of interpretation. Understanding programs corresponds to understand their semantics. This is strictly connected with interpretation. Malicious host understand code by analysing (either dynamically or statically) the code. This corresponds precisely to make an abstract interpretation, including the dynamic and static cases as instances with respectively non-decidable and decidable abstractions. In this case, O(P ) is an obfuscation of P if the abstract interpretation of O(P ) fails (is less precise) than the same abstract interpretation of P . Failing precision means failing completeness, therefore:
obfuscating programs is making abstract interpreters incomplete
The larger is the set of incomplete interpreters the stronger is the obfuscation. Let ρ ∈ uco(Σ * ) be a property of the execution traces of programs in P, and let O : P −→ P be a program transformation, i.e.,
This is equivalent to say that ρ([[O(P
The following examples will clarify this idea and show how the basic abstract domain and semantics transformers for completeness can be used in this context. Consider variable splitting used in slicing obfuscation [38] . Here obfuscation is performed by data-type refinement: variables v ∈ Var(P ) are split into pairs of vari-
Consider the following simple program P P : v = 0; while v < N {v + +} and the corresponding obfuscated code O(P )
In this case, O(P ) obfuscates interval analysis. Consider the abstract domain ι ∈ uco(℘([−m, m])) of limited intervals, where m ∈ Z is the maximal integer. In this case ι(x) = [min(x), max(x)]. Interval analysis is defined in [14] , with standard bca abstract interpretations for arithmetic operations on intervals: , ⊕, . In this case the abstract collecting semantics for P is
It is clear that the obfuscation here makes the interval abstract interpretation incomplete. This example shows that code obfuscation defeats abstract interpretation by weakening the generated invariants. Weak enough generated invariants make difficult the understanding of code, because strong invariants provide sufficient information to understand code behaviour. The role of weakened invariants by the malicious host analysis is essential in code obfuscation and models from this point of view the potency for the corresponding code transformation. The weaker is the generated invariant the more obscure is the code. 
and its obfuscation O(P ) by array splitting [25] , which is a generalisation to arrays of variable splitting
holding in the while statement of P . This invariant can be automatically generated by an abstract interpreter which performs relational static analysis on the abstract domain ιι 1 −→ η, where η, ιι ∈ uco(℘(V)), such that 1= ∩, ιι(X) = ι(S), S, a ∈ X is the attribute independent extension of interval analysis to V, and η = γ + •α where 
In this case we have:
The obfuscation here breaks the coherence of the invariant property detected by η, by splitting the original array into two arrays which are not In view of this approach to code obfuscation and of the transformations developed in [29] , it is possible to maximally obfuscate a given semantics by inducing maximal incompleteness in code instructions. The idea is to defeat a given abstraction by transforming code instructions in order to make them maximally incomplete for that abstration. Let us introduce this idea by an example. It is easy to prove that the limited-interval abstract domain is a meetuniform closure: if Y ⊆ ℘([−m, m]) and for any x, y ∈ Y : ι(x) = ι(y), then for any x, y ∈ Y. min(x) = min(y) ∧ max(x) = max(y). Therefore there exists z ∈ Y such that ι( Y ) = ι(z). In this case,
). This observation may drive us towards the systematic design of obfuscated code against interval analysis. Consider the following simple program.
P :
The forward limited interval analysis of P with x = [5, 8] returns: 4, 10] . Therefore, in order to make interval analysis B-incomplete before program point c, we can define a command c such that
In this case, ι − (wlp x = x * x ι (x ∈ [10, 100])) = {4, 10}.
The following command:
satisfies this condition. Clearly we have to cope with intermediate values in such a way that the variable y is set to 5 for all x ∈ [4, 10], keeping in this way the behavioural equivalence. This is achieved by implementing the ι − closure. Also this implementation has to exploit incompleteness in such a way that its output interval may activate both branches of c . The following command, obfuscated with simple equivalent instruction sequences, implements ι − with these features for all relevant inputs x ∈ [4, 10]:
The resulting obfuscated code is:
In this case the maximal incomplete transformation of c requires the analogous transformation of all instructions from which c depends, i.e., the backward slice of c in P . The limited interval analysis of O(P ) starting with x = 7 is:
The key point here is the ability of command c to make incomplete the evaluation of the test in c, causing the loss of precision in the analysis of variable y. This obfuscation schema can be used for generating obfuscated code by systematic transformations of semantics, in particular when dealing with opaque predicates and control-flow obfuscation. In this case, the maximal incomplete transformers may help providing obscure opaque predicates. Breaking them requires more complex refined abstract domains and analysis. In the case of the example above, the refined analysis needs either to discover constant expressions (e.g., x − (x − 4) and x − (x − 4)) or perform some form of disjunctive completion in interval analysis, the latter being extremely expensive ( (ι) = id).
Hiding information
Among the different methods for hiding secrets in programs, software watermarking is one of the most common. We consider a steganographic approach to software watermarking, i.e., program transformations where the intended (typically copyright) signature is hidden from external observers. We follow [19] by defining the stegomarker M : S−→ P as the encoding of the signature s ∈ S into a program M(s) ∈ P, called the stegomark. The stegolayer L : P × P−→ P is used to compose the stegomark with the source (cover) program. The (watermarked) stegoprogram is S : P × S −→ P such that S(P, s) = L(P, M(s)). The standard taxonomy of software watermarking in [9, 6, 42] distinguish between static watermarking, where signatures are encoded as properties of the code text, and dynamic watremarking, where the signature is encoded in the state computed by the stegoprogram under suitable inputs. Abstract watermarking, introduced in [19] , is different: the signature is encoded as a stegomark in the cover program and can be extracted by suitable static program analysis.
We believe that static and dynamic watermarking are instances of abstract watermarking, under suitable choices for M and L. In particular, they are instances of a common pattern which corresponds precisely to the program transformations making semantics complete [29] . Let P ∈ P and α, Ñ, η ∈ uco(Σ * ) be program properties such that α Ñ.
Static software watermarking corresponds to η = id, i.e., ∀x. S(s, P ) α (x) = M(s) α (x) ∈ Ñ, and α decidable. This means that the interpretation of the stegoprogram always reveals the watermark, independently from the input. In dynamic watermarking instead η = id, meaning that only suitable inputs may reveal the watermark. In this case, the inputs revealing the watermark are all the inputs satisfying η. In this context, the syntactic stegomarker M(·) can be associated with a semantic stegomarker M · : S−→ uco(Σ * ). It is immediate to recognise a Fcompleteness transformation here: A stegoprogram reveals the watermark Ñ under input η if its abstract semantics is Fcomplete for Ñ and η. The abstract semantics · α performs watermark extraction which is, as in [19] , implemented as abstract interpretation. Therefore S(s, P ) is a stegoprogram if:
happen that Ñ, η ∈ F(℘(Σ * ), S(s, P ) ) [34, 29] . This means that the knowledge of the stegomarker may not be sufficient in order to extract the watermark. This makes the extraction completely dependent on the suitable choice of the abstract semantics · α . In this sense, code obfuscation can be used in order to design appropriate stegolayers making Ñ, η incomplete for the standard interpreter · . This is a further weakening with respect to abstract watermarking [19] , where Ñ = α and the secrecy relies upon the difficulty to guess Ñ out of any blind static or dynamic analysis of the stegoprogram. Credibility, data-rate, and resilience [6] rely upon the choice of the properties α and Ñ. High credibility corresponds to α, Ñ ∈ uco(Σ * ) such that P α ∈ Ñ (i.e., Ñ( P α ) ≈ minimises false positives). Resilience is high when Ñ, and therefore α, are both hard to guess and they are preserved by most common program transformations. Stealthy instead depends upon the implementation of the stegolayer, which has to produce output code which is as similar as possible to P . Note that, being F ↓ and F ↑ idempotent transformations, they provide also a code tamper-detection method similar to the one used for images in mathematical morphology [35] . In this case, because
α , then any malicious host attack (e.g., distortive) transformation t : P−→ P such that F ↑↓ η,M s ( t(S(s, P )) α ) = t(S(s, P )) α will reveal the attack. It is easy to encode within this schema most well-known watermarking methods. We sketch some of these encoding for popular watermarking methods. Abstract watermarking [18] is immediate. Block reordering: this static watermarking corresponds to the following choices: η = id (static); given a signature (number) s and an encoding of numbers in graphs as sequences of basic blocks E : N−→ G then M s is the atomic closure {G s , Σ * } ∈ uco(Σ * ) where
and P α extracts the CFG of P , which is an (incomplete) abstract interpretation of the trace semantics P provided that states include code instructions with labels. The abstraction α forgets about memory locations and computed values and just keeps track of the sequence of program instructions isolating basic blocks (consecutive instructions) as graph nodes and determining possible jumps between blocks as graph edges [49] . A dynamic version of block reordering can be implemented by choosing η = id. In this case S(s, P ) has to include a block reordering algorithm, which is activated when x ∈ η, as in metamorphic malware [20] . The same abstractions can be used for encoding Venkatesan et al. CFG-based watermarking [51] . Constraint-based watermarking: we consider the graph-coloring static (non-blind) watermarking solution in [46] , applied to register allocation. In this case program states include register allocation mappings R : Var(P ) −→ R, where R is a given (fixed) finite set of registers. Elements in Σ are c, R, H , where H ∈ H is a heap and c is the current instruction. R is statically computed by a pre-processing phase. In this case η = id, and α = β + •β where β :
α is decidable and it extracts the interference graph associated with a given register allocation, as an abstract interpretation of the trace semantics. Graph-based watermarking: the dynamic graph-based watermarking encodes the watermark in a suitable data-structure which is allocated in memory [12, 43] . In this case, programs states are as above, including the sequence of input values i ∈ V * which still have to be consumed: c, R, H, i , η = {I, Σ * } where I ∈ V * is a given input sequence, Ñ = {E(s), Σ * } where E(s) is the encoding of s as a graph G s ∈ G. α observes the graphs encoded in memory, by looking at graphs in reverse allocation order. In this case α = δ + •δ where H : H−→ G extracts the set of all graphs allocated in memory with root allocated as last, and δ : ℘(Σ * ) m −→ G is such that:
Threading watermarking [41] would need a different computational model, including multithreading and concurrency. In this case the extractors should correspond to a complete abstract interpretation modelling execution paths, which encode the watermark.
Finding completeness holes
Obscuring code and hiding information are different aspects of the same issue, which is making an interpreter incomplete, either by transforming the source code by obfuscation or by designing suitable code (the stegoprogram) whose interpretation is incomplete unless some key properties (the secret watermark extractor) are known. In both cases, a basic program transformation is defined: O for obfuscation and M for specifying the stegomark. The transformed program is then integrated with other (non affected) code by a suitable program integration method, which is the stegolayer L in software watermarking and it is standard sequential composition in most code obfuscation. We generalise this situation by considering a generic (binary associative) program integration method I : P × P −→ P [48] . The obfuscation of code parts and the stegomarks have to preserve the observable semantics of the original program when the transformed code is integrated by I with a cover program. As observed above, e.g., in the last example of Section 7, the code transformation may affect the semantics of internal variables (x) provided that the observable behaviour (y) is not affected by this transformation. This can be precisely captured by abstract non-interfernce [27] . Abstract non-interference (ANI) [27] is a natural weakening of non-interference by abstract interpretation. Consider a partition of values/states Σ = V = V L × V H in public L and private H values. We consider a pair of external observations η, ρ ∈ uco(V L ) (the attacker) and φ ∈ uco(V H ) (the secret) which specifies which property of the private data cannot flow to the output observation. Recall that a program P satisfies (blocked) ANI, (η)P (φ []ρ), if
This notion says that, whenever the attacker is able to observe the input property η and the ρ property of the output, then no information flow concerning the property φ of the secret input interferes with the output observation ρ. In order to model secrecy in code transformations we consider a higher-order version of ANI, called HOANI, which shares with ANI all relevant properties [27, 28] . Here programs in P are partitioned in cover programs P ⊆ P and secret programs Q ⊆ P. The cover (unaffected) program plays the role of the public input, the private input is the secret code whose properties have to be kept secret by the program integration method I. The pair η, ρ specifies here the cover/output observable, which is in our case the attacker. Let ρ, η, φ ∈ uco(℘(Σ)) and ρ ρ ∈ uco(℘(Σ) m −→ ℘(Σ)) such that ρ ρ def = λf. ρ•f •ρ [17] . Let P 1 , P 2 ∈ P be (public) cover programs and Q 1 , Q 2 ∈ Q be (secret) programs, e.g., holding a watermark or breaking an invariant at some given program point for obfuscation. Then (η)I(φ []ρ) holds in (denotational-based) HOANI if for any of these programs:
In code obfuscation, Q = {O(P ), P }, P ⊆ P and we want that φ . In software watermarking instead, Q = M(s) s ∈ S , P ⊆ P, and we want that (ρ)I(Ñ []ρ) holds for the largest possible set of ρ such that ρ = α. In this case the systematic derivation of the strongest harmless attackersρ such that (ρ)I(Ñ []ρ) [27] may provide a useful measure of the secrecy of the stegomark.
Discussion
In this paper we studied completeness in the context of code obfuscation and watermarking. This is different with respect to the notion of obfuscated interpretations in [40] . In this latter case the obfuscating transformation is applied to the interpreter in such a way that the interpretation of a command c is not fixed. This provides amazing results in terms of software protection via obscurity. We believe that also this idea can be fully specified and studied in terms of completeness of an abstract interpretation. The influence of data-type refinement approach to code obfuscation [25] in our approach is clear. While completeness methods provide driving guidelines for specifying and evaluating obfuscation and watermarking tools, the data-type refinement, which can be clearly specified in abstract interpretation forms, provides the basis for proving correctness of the transformations. We believe that both methods should be included into any comprehensive theory of information hiding in code. From this point of view, we believe that HOANI is more general than data-type refinement based correctness methods [25] , providing both correctness and secrecy in a unique setting. From a practical point of view, the use the logic for information flow [2] may provide useful interference information between the variables involved in obfuscated/watermarked code and the cover program. As future work we are interested in extending the calculational design of program transformations by abstract interpretation in [18] to the calculational design of obfuscated code, as in [23] , including completeness transformers in the framework. We are also interested in deriving appropriate metrics for estimating the quality of an obfuscation and watermarking method. The completeness-based approach to information hiding may provide here useful metrics, such as the one in [1, 45] measuring the degree of information leakage, which is known to be strongly related with the incompleteness of an abstract interpretation [28] . Of particular interest could be exploiting incompleteness holes derived from the inaccurate propagation of roundoff errors in floating-point operations [39] . This can be exploited, provided that inaccuracy is confined in the sense of ANI, in particular in advanced numerical software watermarking.
